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Abstract	  
	  The	  United	  States’	  experience	  with	  the	  Ebola	  virus	  in	  2014	  provides	  a	  window	  into	  US	  public	  health	  politics.	  First,	  the	  US	  provided	  a	  case	  study	  in	  the	  role	  of	  suasion	  and	  executive	  action	  in	  the	  management	  of	  public	  health	  in	  a	  fragmented	  multi-­‐level	  system.	  The	  variable	  capacity	  of	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  US	  to	  respond	  to	  Ebola	  on	  the	  level	  of	  hospitals	  or	  state	  governments,	  and	  their	  different	  approaches,	  show	  the	  limitations	  of	  federal	  influence,	  the	  importance	  of	  knowledge	  and	  executive	  energy,	  and	  the	  diversity	  of	  both	  powerful	  actors	  and	  sources	  of	  power.	  Second,	  the	  politics	  of	  Ebola	  in	  the	  US	  is	  a	  case	  study	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  partisan	  blame	  attribution.	  The	  outbreak	  struck	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  an	  election	  that	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  good	  for	  the	  Republican	  party,	  and	  the	  election	  dominated	  interest	  in	  and	  opinions	  of	  Ebola	  in	  both	  the	  media	  and	  public	  opinion.	  Democratic	  voters	  and	  media	  downplayed	  Ebola	  while	  Republican	  voters	  and	  media	  focused	  on	  the	  outbreak.	  The	  media	  was	  a	  key	  conduit	  for	  this	  strategic	  politicization,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  quantity,	  timing,	  and	  framing	  of	  news	  about	  Ebola.	  Neither	  fragmentation	  nor	  partisanship	  appears	  to	  be	  going	  away,	  so	  understanding	  the	  politics	  of	  public	  health	  crises	  will	  remain	  important.	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Introduction	  The	  United	  States	  had	  little	  to	  fear	  from	  Ebola.	  When	  the	  2014	  Ebola	  outbreak	  in	  West	  Africa	  began	  to	  receive	  attention,	  American	  public	  health	  officials	  hastened	  to	  make	  reassuring	  statements,	  emphasizing	  the	  consensus	  that	  Ebola	  was	  transmitted	  primarily	  through	  intimate	  contact	  with	  bodily	  fluids	  of	  infectious	  victims	  and	  therefore	  primarily	  a	  risk	  to	  health	  care	  providers	  close	  to	  victims	  of	  the	  outbreak.	  The	  American	  public	  was	  in	  much	  more	  danger	  of	  getting	  sick	  or	  dying	  from	  a	  more	  banal	  illness,	  like	  the	  flu.	  	  The	  focus,	  U.S.	  public	  health	  leaders	  suggested,	  should	  be	  on	  Ebola	  as	  a	  global	  health	  threat	  that	  should	  be	  addressed	  in	  Africa	  (Fauci	  2014,	  Frieden	  et	  al.	  2014).	  	  	  In	  retrospect,	  those	  public	  health	  officials	  were	  correct.	  In	  2014-­‐15,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  a	  total	  of	  eleven	  cases	  on	  its	  soil,	  four	  diagnosed	  in	  the	  country	  and	  seven	  of	  them	  evacuated	  from	  Africa	  after	  diagnosis.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  political	  response	  to	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  marked	  by	  a	  long	  string	  of	  news	  stories	  about	  incompetence	  and	  divergent	  government	  responses	  to	  the	  outbreak.	  The	  outbreak	  became	  a	  highly	  politicized	  topic	  which	  morphed	  into	  broader	  discussions	  of	  border	  security,	  immigration	  policy,	  and	  terrorism	  (SteelFisher,	  Blendon,	  and	  Lasala-­‐Blanco	  2015).	  	  	   The	  combination	  of	  decentralized	  management	  of	  the	  outbreak	  with	  highly	  partisan	  public	  debate	  is	  typical	  of	  American	  politics.	  The	  Ebola	  experience	  of	  2014	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  case	  study	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  public	  health	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Understanding	  the	  policy,	  and	  political,	  responses	  to	  the	  disease	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  operation	  of	  public	  health,	  the	  political	  system,	  and	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  two.	  It	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underlines	  how	  powerful,	  and	  patterned,	  political	  forces	  shape	  public	  health	  action.	  In	  particular,	  it	  highlights	  how	  in	  a	  fragmented	  system	  responses	  tend	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  suasion-­‐	  persuasive	  expertise-­‐	  and	  executive	  action	  by	  presidents	  and	  governors	  rather	  than	  a	  coherent	  bureaucratic	  response.	  	  Section	  One	  sketches	  the	  background	  of	  public	  health	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  is	  a	  fragmented	  system	  in	  a	  fragmented	  country.	  Section	  Two	  argues	  that	  any	  public	  health	  action	  involves	  coordination	  of	  the	  federal	  government,	  state	  governments,	  public	  health	  agencies,	  and	  the	  American	  healthcare	  system.	  In	  each	  organization,	  there	  is	  a	  set	  of	  diverse	  actors	  who	  operate	  in	  a	  complex	  institutional	  landscape	  with	  no	  authoritative	  single	  source	  of	  regulation.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  action	  takes	  place	  through	  a	  mixture	  of	  executive	  initiative,	  forcing	  coordination	  within	  states	  or	  the	  federal	  government,	  and	  suasion	  between	  governments	  and	  the	  health	  system,	  relying	  on	  guidelines	  and	  expertise	  rather	  than	  hierarchical	  authority	  to	  shape	  responses.	  	  Section	  Three	  turns	  from	  public	  health	  response	  to	  the	  politics	  that	  shaped	  policymakers’	  incentives	  and	  public	  perceptions.	  It	  argues	  that	  public	  opinion	  is	  affected	  by	  media	  outlet	  coverage	  of	  an	  event.	  Elites	  “cue”	  the	  public,	  especially	  partisans,	  with	  views	  about	  the	  importance	  and	  development	  of	  issues	  such	  as	  Ebola.	  We	  examine	  the	  role	  that	  media	  play	  in	  the	  politicization	  of	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak.	  We	  track	  the	  frequency	  and	  usage	  of	  stories	  related	  to	  Ebola	  in	  the	  six	  month	  period	  leading	  up	  the	  2014	  midterm	  elections	  on	  Fox	  News	  and	  MSNBC.	  We	  find	  that	  Fox	  News	  began	  covering	  the	  outbreak	  earlier,	  and	  produced	  stories	  more	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frequently	  than	  MSNBC,	  until	  immediately	  after	  the	  midterm	  elections,	  at	  which	  point	  coverage	  waned	  on	  the	  network.	  	  Section	  Four	  then	  turns	  to	  the	  public,	  the	  audience	  for	  both	  media	  and	  politicians.	  Political	  scientists	  routinely	  find	  that	  blame	  attribution	  and	  interest	  in	  a	  topic	  are	  more	  driven	  by	  pre-­‐existing	  political	  views	  in	  the	  mass	  public	  than	  by	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  management	  of	  the	  outbreak.	  Ebola	  interest	  peaked	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  4	  November	  2014	  midterm	  election,	  when	  the	  opposition	  Republicans,	  who	  controlled	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  had	  incentive	  to	  pin	  blame	  on	  the	  incumbent	  Democrats	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  gain	  majority	  control	  of	  the	  Senate.	  We	  show	  that	  in	  the	  month	  before	  the	  elections,	  Ebola	  became	  much	  more	  salient	  amongst	  Republican	  voters	  than	  Democratic	  voters.	  The	  politicization	  of	  the	  outbreak	  eventually	  involved	  President	  Obama,	  the	  federal	  government,	  and	  news	  media	  handling	  of	  Ebola	  and	  the	  beliefs	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  outbreak	  striking	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	   Taken	  together,	  these	  themes	  indicate	  that	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  greater	  awareness	  of	  the	  political	  dynamics	  at	  play	  for	  public	  health	  officials.	  Too	  many	  public	  health	  practitioners,	  who	  daily	  work	  on	  the	  front	  lines	  of	  federal,	  state,	  and	  local	  health	  departments,	  believe	  that	  they	  are	  immune	  from	  political	  machinations	  when	  they	  are	  not	  (Oliver	  2006).	  As	  Lawrence	  Brown	  notes,	  “The	  public	  health	  community	  seldom	  acknowledges	  that	  its	  work	  is	  pervasively	  political,	  much	  less	  explores	  in	  depth	  how	  that	  political	  saturation	  shapes	  its	  professional	  life”	  (Brown	  2010).	  But	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  appreciate	  the	  role	  of	  politics.	  Some	  understanding	  of	  political	  dynamics,	  including	  public	  opinion,	  media	  effects,	  and	  the	  role	  of	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intergovernmental	  relations	  is	  necessary	  to	  determine	  what	  kinds	  of	  actions	  are	  possible,	  plausible,	  or	  to	  be	  expected.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  the	  	  “command	  and	  control”	  approach	  to	  outbreaks	  espoused	  by	  the	  WHO	  simply	  does	  not	  work	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  where	  authority	  is	  diffused,	  influence	  is	  often	  through	  expertise,	  executives	  of	  states	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  have	  great	  power	  and	  conflicting	  incentives,	  and	  both	  media	  and	  public	  tend	  to	  use	  polarizing	  political	  frames	  (World	  Health	  Organization	  2000,	  Greer	  2016).	  The	  mixture	  of	  suasion	  and	  executive	  action	  in	  the	  response	  to	  partisanship	  and	  elite	  cueing	  in	  public	  is	  not	  just	  predictable	  and	  unavoidable	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  It	  also	  shapes	  what	  is	  possible	  for	  public	  health	  policy.	  	  	  
I.	  Communicable	  disease	  control	  in	  a	  fragmented	  system	  	  “Fragmentation”	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  words	  of	  American	  health	  policy	  studies	  (Okma	  and	  Marmor	  2015,	  White	  2009,	  Emanuel	  2014).	  The	  United	  States	  has	  a	  fragmented	  political	  system,	  with	  an	  internally	  divided	  federal	  government,	  fifty	  states	  with	  constitutionally	  granted	  public	  health	  powers,	  which	  are	  also	  internally	  divided,	  and	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  local	  governments	  with	  varying	  emergency	  management	  and	  health	  responsibilities	  and	  capabilities.	  	  	  
System	  There	  is	  little	  dispute	  that	  the	  American	  health	  care	  system	  is	  fragmented.	  Providers	  vary	  in	  scale,	  from	  large	  “systems”	  to	  small	  doctors’	  practices,	  and	  their	  ownership	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can	  be	  public,	  private,	  or	  non-­‐profit.	  Many	  non-­‐profit	  systems,	  even	  ones	  carrying	  residual	  religious	  connections,	  are	  every	  bit	  as	  focused	  on	  expansion,	  market	  share	  and	  margin	  as	  for-­‐profit	  companies.	  Gaps	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  health	  care,	  as	  of	  2014,	  were	  partially	  being	  filled	  by	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act,	  which	  provided	  public	  (Medicaid)	  insurance	  in	  some	  states	  or	  subsidized	  private	  insurance	  to	  the	  previously	  uninsured	  in	  all	  states	  (White	  2013).	  The	  result	  is	  that	  the	  capacity	  of	  providers	  to	  invest	  in	  communicable	  disease	  is	  variable,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  they	  will	  make	  investments	  or	  formulate	  effective	  policies.	  Nor	  is	  there	  a	  single,	  coherent,	  centre	  of	  power	  over	  provider	  behaviour,	  or	  shared	  set	  of	  strategic	  and	  operational	  goals	  among	  providers,	  or	  even	  a	  reliable	  way	  to	  coordinate	  patient	  movements	  in	  a	  given	  area	  with	  public	  health	  agencies.	  With	  a	  disease	  such	  as	  Ebola,	  which	  is	  substantially	  a	  healthcare-­‐acquired	  infection,	  this	  diversity	  of	  providers	  is	  particularly	  important	  as	  they	  are	  key	  actors	  in	  its	  control	  or	  propagation.	  	  
States	  In	  the	  basic	  American	  federal	  structure,	  core	  public	  health	  powers	  such	  as	  the	  power	  to	  quarantine	  are	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  “police	  power”	  that	  belongs	  to	  the	  states,	  not	  the	  federal	  government.	  Federal	  government’s	  coercive	  powers	  are	  enumerated	  and	  focused	  on	  interstate	  commerce	  and	  border	  protection	  (Katz	  and	  Rosenbaum	  2010).	  The	  residual	  power	  to	  control	  citizens’	  lives,	  including	  taking	  public	  health	  measures,	  belongs	  to	  states	  as	  part	  of	  their	  police	  power.	  The	  politics,	  laws,	  and	  capacity	  of	  the	  state	  you	  are	  in	  matter	  a	  great	  deal	  if	  you	  are	  caught	  up	  in	  an	  American	  public	  health	  emergency.	  
	   7	  
	   The	  fifty	  American	  states,	  which	  vary	  in	  size	  from	  the	  half	  million	  people	  of	  Wyoming	  to	  the	  39	  million	  people	  of	  California	  (the	  median	  state	  has	  a	  population	  of	  about	  five	  million),	  have	  major	  policy	  responsibilities	  and	  generally	  sophisticated	  and	  competent	  bureaucracies	  in	  interestingly	  diverse	  political	  systems.	  For	  example,	  they	  were	  quickly	  and	  successfully	  able	  to	  identify	  and	  monitor	  people	  exposed	  to	  Ebola	  (Stehling-­‐Ariza	  et	  al.	  2015).	  Their	  governors	  are	  high	  profile	  figures,	  often	  with	  national	  ambitions	  and	  media	  coverage.	  Governors	  also	  have	  no	  significant	  foreign	  policy	  roles,	  so	  they	  need	  not	  balance	  their	  interests	  in	  domestic	  affairs	  with	  a	  broader	  global	  health	  approach.	  	  Lacking	  resources	  which	  are	  only	  available	  to	  the	  federal	  government,	  and	  frequently	  delegating	  public	  health	  work	  to	  local	  authorities,	  states	  are	  generally	  less	  invested	  in	  anticipating	  public	  health	  crises.	  Furthermore,	  federal	  public	  health	  agencies,	  such	  as	  the	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  (CDC)	  and	  the	  Federal	  Emergency	  Management	  Agency,	  are	  intended	  to	  operate	  in	  states	  when	  they	  face	  public	  health	  crises,	  lessening	  states	  need	  to	  invest	  in	  these	  agencies.	  	  	  
The	  federal	  government	  The	  U.S.	  federal	  government	  has	  three	  kinds	  of	  relevant	  powers	  in	  relation	  to	  Ebola.	  One	  is	  its	  control	  over	  borders.	  The	  federal	  government	  can	  detain	  or	  otherwise	  regulate	  people	  who	  seek	  to	  cross	  US	  international	  borders.	  The	  second	  is	  through	  its	  power	  over	  interstate	  affairs,	  notably	  through	  the	  “commerce	  clause”	  allowing	  it	  to	  regulate	  interstate	  commerce,	  which	  justifies	  much	  public	  health	  regulation.	  The	  Commerce	  Clause	  effectively	  allowed	  the	  New	  Deal	  and	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  American	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administrative	  state.	  It	  is	  therefore	  no	  accident	  that	  legal	  and	  political	  writings	  about	  the	  police	  power	  tailed	  off	  in	  the	  1930s	  as	  the	  modern	  U.S.	  administrative	  state	  was	  born.	  The	  Commerce	  Clause	  also	  authorizes	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  take	  direct	  action	  regarding	  people	  seeking	  to	  cross	  state	  boundaries.	  	  The	  third	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  spend	  its	  own	  money,	  for	  example	  by	  creating	  guidelines	  for	  personal	  protective	  equipment,	  funding	  research,	  or	  sustaining	  the	  thousands	  of	  experts	  who	  work	  at	  CDC.	  That	  spending	  power	  includes	  the	  basic	  mechanisms	  underpinning	  access	  to	  emergency	  health	  care.	  The	  federal	  government’s	  extensive	  fiscal	  role	  means	  that	  it	  is	  a	  major	  influence	  on	  provider	  behaviour,	  through	  its	  policing	  of	  the	  non-­‐profit	  tax	  exemption	  and	  through	  compliance	  required	  by	  participation	  in	  its	  giant	  health	  care	  programs	  such	  as	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid.	  	  There	  are	  three	  major	  loci	  of	  federal	  bureaucratic	  response	  to	  a	  problem	  like	  Ebola.	  One	  is	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  (DHS).	  DHS	  was	  involved	  because	  of	  its	  border	  control	  function.	  It	  is	  also	  by	  law	  the	  principal	  department	  for	  major	  incidents,	  though	  the	  role	  of	  DHS	  in	  coordinating	  and	  responding	  to	  disease	  outbreaks	  is	  not	  as	  clear	  as	  its	  role	  in	  other	  kinds	  of	  incident	  (Kettl	  2007,	  Morhard	  and	  Franco	  2013).	  DHS	  was	  created	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  September	  11	  attacks	  to	  improve	  coordination	  among	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  US	  domestic	  security	  agencies,	  from	  counterterrorism	  to	  exotic	  biosecurity	  programs	  to	  border	  control	  to	  the	  Coast	  Guard	  to	  emergency	  management.	  Its	  relatively	  recent	  assembly	  out	  of	  often	  long-­‐established	  agencies,	  and	  the	  rapidly	  changing	  security	  politics	  of	  the	  administrations	  of	  George	  W.	  Bush	  and	  Barack	  Obama	  all	  mean	  it	  lacks	  the	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coherence	  of	  even	  a	  normal	  American	  cabinet-­‐level	  department.	  Internal	  diversity,	  low	  morale,	  and	  poor	  coordination	  are	  among	  its	  most	  salient	  characteristics	  (Kettl	  2007).	  For	  example,	  DHS	  has	  to	  answer	  to	  more	  than	  90	  congressional	  subcommittees	  and	  committees,	  and	  approximately	  thirty	  more	  task	  forces	  and	  similar	  congressional	  bodies	  (Markon	  2014).	  Coordinating	  within	  DHS	  is	  a	  problem,	  and	  there	  are	  questions	  about	  its	  ability	  to	  contribute	  much,	  other	  than	  coordination,	  to	  the	  work	  of	  other	  departments	  in	  public	  health.	  The	  other	  salient	  characteristic	  of	  DHS	  is	  that	  it	  is	  much	  more	  focused	  on	  security,	  such	  as	  emergency	  management	  and	  bioterrorism	  preparedness,	  than	  on	  health	  per	  se.	  Security	  organizations	  and	  emergency	  managers	  have	  a	  style	  and	  staff	  that	  are	  quite	  distinct	  from	  public	  health	  (Fidler	  and	  Gostin	  2008,	  Lakoff	  and	  Collier	  2008,	  Botoseneanu	  et	  al.	  2011).	  The	  second,	  more	  prominent,	  centre	  of	  Ebola-­‐related	  activity	  in	  the	  federal	  government	  is	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services	  (DHHS).	  	  Within	  DHHS,	  the	  centre	  of	  expertise	  and	  prestige	  is	  the	  CDC.	  CDC	  has	  been	  tremendously	  influential	  in	  public	  health	  over	  the	  decades	  since	  it	  began	  as	  a	  malaria	  control	  unit	  during	  World	  War	  Two,	  shaping	  basic	  public	  health	  concepts	  such	  as	  surveillance	  and	  carving	  out	  a	  connection	  with	  security	  agencies	  (Etheridge	  1992,	  Fearnley	  2010).	  	  The	  third,	  most	  important	  center,	  is	  the	  executive-­‐	  the	  White	  House.	  Major	  issues	  such	  as	  Ebola	  are	  coordinated	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  through	  White	  House	  advisors	  and	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  (the	  principal	  venue	  for	  coordination	  on	  security	  issues,	  when	  it	  is	  working	  as	  intended,	  but	  also	  one	  focused	  on	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international	  rather	  than	  domestic	  affairs).	  	  Departments	  and	  agencies	  are	  pulled	  in	  so	  many	  directions,	  by	  their	  missions,	  legacies,	  and	  particular	  constituencies	  that	  it	  takes	  conscious	  assertion	  of	  White	  House	  power	  to	  coordinate	  them	  (Sylves	  2014).	  As	  with	  DHS,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  NSC	  is	  less	  clearly	  defined	  in	  public	  health	  incidents	  than	  in	  other	  kinds	  of	  emergencies.	  	  	  	  
Suasion	  and	  executive	  action	  	  In	  such	  a	  diverse	  system,	  formal,	  hierarchical,	  governance	  is	  not	  the	  rule.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  much	  of	  the	  response	  to	  public	  health	  events	  such	  as	  Ebola	  is	  a	  mixture	  of	  suasion	  and	  executive	  action.	  Suasion,	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  elsewhere,	  is	  a	  way	  to	  overcome	  fragmented	  governance	  arrangements	  by	  using	  non-­‐hierarchical	  means	  such	  as	  offering	  assistance,	  writing	  guidelines,	  and	  financing	  networks	  of	  professionals.	  It	  compensates	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  top-­‐down	  hierarchical	  governance	  in	  the	  US	  by	  diffusing	  agreements	  on	  how	  to	  work.	  It	  also	  often	  empowers	  the	  federal	  government,	  which,	  thanks	  to	  CDC,	  is	  rich	  in	  the	  kinds	  of	  resources	  and	  networks	  that	  are	  effective	  in	  suasion.	  For	  example,	  once	  the	  CDC	  released	  their	  recommendations	  for	  appropriate	  infection	  control	  procedures	  related	  to	  Ebola,	  it	  became	  the	  near-­‐automatic	  resource	  for	  hospital	  administrators	  as	  they	  contemplated	  the	  threat	  of	  disease	  and	  their	  organizational	  response.	  CDC	  guidelines,	  even	  the	  ones	  without	  binding	  authority	  such	  as	  recommendations	  for	  disease	  management,	  enjoy	  a	  legitimacy	  that	  other	  guidelines	  do	  not.	  Finally,	  those	  resources,	  such	  as	  CDC	  laboratories	  and	  experts,	  and	  its	  emergency	  management	  personnel,	  can	  assist	  local	  actors.	  In	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general,	  state	  and	  local	  authorities	  and	  health	  systems	  are	  highly	  responsive	  to	  CDC	  and	  will	  rarely	  contest	  its	  technical	  advice.	  In	  turn,	  if	  CDC	  advice	  is	  slow,	  changeable	  or	  contested,	  as	  it	  was	  during	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak,	  its	  effectiveness	  might	  rapidly	  diminish.	  Unsurprisingly,	  in	  such	  a	  fragmented	  system,	  executives	  such	  as	  governors	  and	  the	  President	  have	  a	  major	  role	  when	  they	  want	  (Hess	  and	  Pfiffner	  2012).	  The	  
Federalist	  Papers,	  written	  by	  authors	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution,	  accurately	  noted	  that	  there	  is	  always	  “energy	  in	  the	  executive”	  which	  tends	  to	  empower	  executives	  over	  time	  and	  in	  crises	  (Federalist	  70).	  	  As	  in	  most	  political	  systems	  (Savoie	  2010),	  the	  normal	  interagency	  coordination	  bureaucracy	  is	  slow	  and	  prone	  to	  failure,	  and	  so	  the	  executive	  develops	  techniques	  to	  act	  decisively,	  and	  force	  compliance,	  when	  the	  President	  really	  wants	  action.	  Likewise,	  in	  the	  states,	  governors	  and	  their	  offices	  tend	  to	  coordinate	  within	  their	  state	  governments	  and	  take	  decisive	  action.	  Executives,	  who	  are	  publicly	  visible	  and	  whom	  voters	  often	  hold	  accountable	  for	  conditions	  in	  their	  jurisdictions	  have	  both	  the	  opportunity	  to	  take	  on	  leading	  roles	  and	  the	  incentive	  to	  do	  so.	  Governors	  with	  ambition	  towards	  higher	  office	  can	  have	  extra	  incentive	  to	  provide	  visible	  leadership.1	  They	  might	  seek	  out	  conflict	  with	  the	  federal	  government,	  for	  example.	  	  The	  result	  is	  an	  American	  pattern	  of	  executive	  energy	  within	  individual	  governments,	  directed	  by	  highly	  visible	  executives,	  and	  suasion	  based	  on	  authoritative	  knowledge.	  Executives	  can	  provide	  coordination	  and	  leadership,	  but	  also	  introduce	  conflict	  when	  they	  disagree	  and	  can	  have	  political	  incentive	  to	  accentuate	  their	  disagreements.	  Suasion	  is	  powerful	  when	  authoritative	  knowledge	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is	  sought	  and	  valued,	  e.g.	  by	  health	  care	  providers	  unaccustomed	  to	  facing	  Ebola.	  Mixtures	  of	  authoritative	  expertise	  such	  as	  that	  of	  CDC,	  which	  enables	  suasion,	  and	  hierarchical	  authority,	  found	  in	  executives,	  drive	  U.S.	  public	  health	  responses.	  	  	  
II.	  Suasion	  and	  executive	  energy	  in	  Ebola	  response	  	  The	  unlikely	  but	  horrifying	  event	  of	  an	  Ebola	  patient	  arriving	  unexpectedly	  was	  just	  what	  happened	  at	  the	  Texas	  Health	  Presbyterian	  Hospital	  (THPH)	  on	  September	  26th,	  2014.	  	  What	  followed	  shows	  the	  interaction	  of	  autonomous	  providers	  in	  a	  fragmented	  health	  care	  system,	  autonomous	  states	  in	  a	  federal	  system,	  and	  a	  fragmented	  federal	  government.	  Multiple	  players	  had	  the	  autonomy	  to	  make	  decisions,	  and	  not	  all	  of	  the	  decisions	  were	  viewed	  favourably	  in	  retrospect.	  	  Thomas	  Duncan,	  a	  Liberian,	  was	  not	  the	  first	  person	  with	  Ebola	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  the	  others	  had	  been	  medically	  evacuated	  from	  West	  Africa	  to	  specialist	  facilities.	  Duncan	  flew	  from	  Liberia	  to	  Dallas,	  Texas	  on	  20	  September.	  On	  26	  September	  he	  felt	  unwell	  and	  went	  to	  THPH’s	  emergency	  department,	  which	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  participation	  in	  Medicare	  was	  obliged	  to	  at	  least	  “stabilize”	  him.	  There	  is	  some	  dispute	  between	  Duncan’s	  family	  and	  THPH	  on	  whether	  Duncan	  told	  his	  providers	  that	  he	  had	  recently	  been	  in	  Liberia,	  but	  regardless	  he	  was	  stabilized	  without	  special	  protocol	  and	  sent	  home.	  Two	  days	  later,	  Duncan	  returned	  to	  THPH	  with	  much	  more	  acute	  symptoms,	  was	  diagnosed	  correctly	  and	  admitted.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  CDC	  arrived	  in	  Dallas,	  but	  only	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  advise	  THPH,	  not	  to	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direct	  Duncan’s	  treatment.	  After	  much	  treatment,	  Duncan	  died	  on	  October	  8	  at	  THPH.	  	  	   Duncan’s	  experience	  highlights	  the	  variable	  nature	  of	  preparation	  for	  Ebola	  in	  American	  hospitals.	  There	  was	  little	  preparation	  at	  THPH	  in	  the	  kinds	  of	  specific	  infection	  control	  measures	  required	  for	  Ebola	  and	  similar	  highly	  infectious	  viral	  haemorrhagic	  infections.	  The	  individual	  nature	  of	  infection	  disease	  control	  within	  hospitals,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  overlapping	  federal,	  state,	  and	  local	  health	  regulations	  is	  not	  surprising,	  and	  nor	  is	  the	  willingness	  of	  tertiary	  care	  hospitals	  to	  take	  on	  ambitious	  tasks	  such	  as	  treating	  an	  Ebola	  patient	  without	  previous	  experience.	  There	  is	  no	  system	  in	  Texas,	  or	  most	  states,	  to	  control	  hospitals’	  investments	  or	  autonomy.	  Decisions	  about,	  for	  example,	  their	  desire	  and	  capacity	  to	  treat	  very	  high-­‐risk	  infectious	  diseases	  are	  left	  to	  the	  managers	  of	  competitive	  hospitals.	  	  Within	  this	  fragmented	  and	  individualized	  system	  of	  care,	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  two	  THPH	  nurses,	  Nina	  Pham	  and	  Amber	  Joy	  Vinson,	  were	  exposed	  to	  Ebola.	  A	  later	  report	  commissioned	  by	  Texas	  Health	  Resources	  concluded	  that	  “CDC	  and	  others	  were	  learning	  alongside	  the	  actual	  providers…	  it	  appears	  that	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  effective	  and	  efficient	  collaboration	  prior	  to	  the	  event…	  The	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  all	  parties	  were	  not	  clearly	  outlined	  in	  advance”	  (Cortese	  et	  al.	  2015).	  Subsequent	  legal	  action	  by	  Pham	  also	  claimed	  that	  THPH	  was	  simply	  unprepared	  to	  handle	  a	  disease	  like	  Ebola,	  with	  managers	  googling	  the	  relevant	  infection	  contro	  protocols	  (Duncan’s	  family	  settled	  a	  case	  against	  THPH)2.	  None	  of	  this	  should	  really	  have	  been	  surprising	  in	  a	  fragmented	  system	  where	  CDC	  is	  largely	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advisory,	  public	  health	  authorities	  have	  little	  legal	  authority	  or	  capacity	  to	  direct	  patients	  around	  the	  health	  care	  system,	  health	  systems	  are	  both	  diverse	  and	  often	  left	  to	  themselves,	  and	  ex-­‐post	  regulation	  via	  lawsuits	  is	  common.	  	  The	  Dallas	  events	  also	  left	  a	  number	  of	  political	  problems	  behind.	  The	  state	  of	  Texas	  had	  quarantined	  people	  associated	  with	  Duncan	  who	  had	  been	  caring	  for	  him	  or	  sharing	  living	  space	  before	  his	  admission,	  and	  then	  quarantined	  the	  two	  nurses	  Pham	  and	  Vinson.	  Vinson’s	  case	  turned	  into	  a	  source	  of	  political	  dispute;	  she	  was	  in	  Cleveland,	  Ohio	  (cleared	  previously	  to	  travel	  by	  a	  CDC	  official)	  when	  it	  emerged	  that	  her	  colleague	  Pham	  had	  been	  exposed	  to	  Ebola.	  Texas	  officials	  declined	  to	  provide	  a	  private	  airplane,	  and	  she	  returned	  to	  Dallas	  on	  a	  commercial	  flight.	  After	  this	  emerged,	  local	  governments	  in	  Ohio	  and	  Texas	  closed	  schools	  and	  took	  other	  actions	  against	  people	  who	  had	  been	  on	  those	  flights	  with	  her.	  Meanwhile	  another	  THPH	  employee,	  a	  laboratory	  technician,	  went	  on	  a	  cruise,	  most	  of	  which	  the	  technician	  had	  to	  spend	  in	  quarantine	  on	  the	  ship	  after	  the	  potential	  Ebola	  exposure	  was	  discovered.	  Mexican	  officials,	  nevertheless,	  refused	  to	  allow	  the	  ship	  to	  dock	  in	  Cozumel.	  Texas	  public	  health	  officials	  were	  criticized	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  appeared	  to	  lack	  clear	  policies	  or	  enforcement	  capabilities,	  and	  did	  not	  use	  their	  powers	  very	  forcefully	  (Walters	  and	  Root	  2014).	  Republican	  Texas	  Governor	  and	  presidential	  candidate	  Rick	  Perry,	  who	  had	  actually	  gone	  on	  a	  trip	  to	  Europe	  during	  the	  events,	  took	  considerable	  criticism	  from	  Democrats.	  He	  responded	  by	  criticizing	  the	  federal	  government	  for	  inadequate	  border	  control,	  and	  set	  up	  a	  task	  force	  to	  reconsider	  the	  state’s	  responses	  (Glueck	  2014,	  Root	  2014).	  	  Texan	  executive	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inaction,	  overenthusiastic	  action	  such	  as	  school	  closures	  afterwards,	  and	  criticism	  of	  CDC’s	  actions	  all	  marked	  Ebola	  as	  a	  political	  problem.	  	  	  
State	  responses	  State	  governors,	  using	  their	  police	  powers,	  quickly	  began	  to	  mark	  out	  a	  robust	  role	  for	  themselves-­‐	  perhaps	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  Perry’s	  experience	  in	  Texas	  (Baker	  and	  Novack	  2014).	  It	  was	  also	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Governors	  who	  were	  presumptive	  presidential	  candidates,	  such	  as	  Democratic	  Governor	  Andrew	  Cuomo	  of	  New	  York	  and	  Republican	  Governors	  Chris	  Christie	  of	  New	  Jersey	  and	  Bobby	  Jindal	  of	  Louisiana,	  to	  prevent	  the	  negative	  press	  associated	  with	  an	  outbreak	  and	  to	  court	  headlines	  by	  taking	  strong	  stances	  on	  mandatory	  quarantines	  (Jindal	  explicitly	  sought	  to	  dissuade	  tropical	  medicine	  specialists	  who	  might	  have	  been	  exposed	  from	  attending	  a	  conference	  in	  New	  Orleans)(Enserink	  2014).	  Overall	  eighteen	  states	  had	  Ebola	  screening	  and	  monitoring	  policies	  which	  were	  more	  restrictive	  than	  the	  CDC’s	  guidelines	  of	  voluntary	  isolation	  and	  monitoring	  of	  travellers	  exposed	  to	  Ebola	  (Prevention	  2015b).	  	  Whether	  a	  governor	  saw	  Ebola	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  make	  a	  national	  mark	  or	  simply	  a	  challenge	  to	  be	  managed,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  a	  governor’s	  calculus	  is	  simpler	  than	  a	  president’s.	  Being	  seen	  to	  manage	  Ebola	  effectively	  in	  one	  state	  involves	  fewer	  trade-­‐offs	  than	  trying	  to	  manage	  it	  globally.	  For	  example,	  the	  White	  House	  sought	  to	  promote	  engagement	  with	  West	  Africa	  in	  order	  to	  stop	  the	  outbreak	  at	  its	  source.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  dispute	  between	  a	  federal	  government,	  which	  did	  not	  want	  to	  dissuade	  efforts	  to	  help	  in	  the	  affected	  countries	  with	  punitive	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policies	  such	  as	  quarantines	  and	  travel	  bans,	  and	  governors,	  who	  wanted	  to	  take	  visible	  action	  to	  protect	  their	  states,	  even	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  Ebola	  becoming	  endemic	  in	  West	  Africa3.	  	  Christie	  and	  Governor	  Paul	  LePage	  of	  Maine	  both	  took	  decisive	  actions	  on	  quarantine	  policy	  and	  quickly	  entered	  a	  struggle	  with	  a	  nurse,	  Kaci	  Hickox,	  who	  had	  returned	  from	  treating	  Ebola	  patients	  in	  Africa	  on	  the	  day	  Christie	  and	  Cuomo	  announced	  quarantine	  policies.	  Christie	  ordered	  that	  she	  be	  quarantined	  against	  her	  will	  in	  a	  tent	  in	  Newark.	  She	  hired	  a	  lawyer,	  received	  media	  attention,	  and	  New	  Jersey	  relaxed	  the	  policy	  and	  let	  her	  go	  to	  her	  home	  in	  Maine	  on	  October	  26th.	  Maine	  Governor	  LePage	  then	  sought	  to	  quarantine	  her	  in	  her	  house,	  sending	  state	  police	  to	  confine	  her	  at	  home	  (Alman	  2014).	  The	  resulting	  footage	  of	  her	  riding	  a	  bicycle	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  governor	  made	  national	  news	  (Roberts	  and	  Glenza	  2014).	  On	  October	  31	  a	  Maine	  judge	  overturned	  the	  quarantine	  order.	  	  
	  
Federal	  response	  Like	  the	  governors,	  the	  President	  came	  under	  pressure	  to	  take	  visible	  action.	  Obama	  publicly	  intervened	  in	  the	  federal	  response	  with	  the	  appointment	  on	  October	  17th,	  a	  bit	  less	  than	  two	  weeks	  before	  the	  upcoming	  midterm	  elections,	  of	  Ron	  Klain,	  a	  former	  chief	  of	  staff	  to	  Vice-­‐Presidents	  Albert	  Gore	  and	  Joe	  Biden	  (Eilperin	  2014).	  	  Ron	  Klain’s	  appointment	  as	  Ebola	  “czar”	  was	  a	  powerful	  and	  predictable	  signal	  in	  Washington:	  the	  President	  was	  taking	  the	  issue	  seriously.	  Klain’s	  appointment	  also	  reduced	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  President’s	  Homeland	  Security	  and	  National	  Security	  advisors,	  who	  were	  engaged	  with	  issues	  such	  as	  conflict	  in	  Syria	  and	  Iraq	  (Eilperin	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2014).	  One	  account	  credits	  Klain	  for	  the	  new	  stricter,	  CDC	  protocol	  on	  PPE	  and	  the	  management	  of	  people	  exposed	  to	  Ebola,	  as	  well	  as	  smoothing	  the	  movement	  of	  contaminated	  materials	  and	  lobbying	  Congress	  for	  expenditure	  on	  Ebola-­‐related	  work	  	  (Eilperin	  and	  Sun	  2015).	  	  Also	  predictably,	  Klain,	  like	  Obama,	  was	  a	  magnet	  for	  criticism.	  Most	  news	  reports	  mention	  that	  he	  was	  not	  a	  doctor	  and	  had	  a	  relatively	  low	  public	  profile,	  for	  which	  he	  was	  criticized	  by,	  especially,	  more	  Republican-­‐leaning	  media	  (the	  New	  
York	  Daily	  News	  ran	  the	  headline	  “Where	  the	  hell	  czar	  you?”).	  Klain	  and	  the	  White	  House	  argued	  that	  coordinating,	  rather	  than	  communications	  or	  medicine,	  was	  his	  task	  	  (Khimm	  2014,	  Warren	  2014).	  	  The	  second	  major	  category	  of	  federal	  response	  focused	  on	  airport	  screenings	  and	  quarantines.	  From	  11	  October,	  passengers	  flying	  into	  the	  United	  States	  from	  countries	  with	  Ebola	  outbreaks	  were	  sent	  to	  one	  of	  five	  airports	  for	  additional	  screening.	  Passengers	  had	  to	  answer	  questions	  from	  DHS	  and	  have	  their	  temperature	  taken	  and	  checked	  for	  other	  Ebola	  symptoms.	  All	  passengers	  had	  to	  monitor	  their	  health	  and	  symptoms	  for	  three	  weeks	  and	  had	  to	  daily	  report	  their	  temperature	  and	  symptoms	  to	  their	  local	  health	  department.	  Each	  was	  given	  a	  thermometer	  and	  health	  log	  to	  document	  their	  temperature	  and	  other	  symptoms	  for	  the	  monitoring	  period,	  along	  with	  a	  cell	  phone	  with	  three	  weeks	  of	  unlimited	  talk	  and	  text	  services	  (Prevention	  2015a).	  	  CDC,	  which	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  Ebola	  before	  the	  Dallas	  events,	  had	  a	  team	  at	  THPH,	  and	  came	  under	  fire	  for	  insufficiently	  rigorous	  guidelines	  and	  inadequate	  assistance	  (Ambrose	  2014).	  Director	  Frieden	  later	  said	  CDC	  should	  have	  
	   18	  
immediately	  become	  involved	  with	  infection	  control	  work	  on	  site,	  rather	  than	  only	  advising	  (Nutt,	  Phillip,	  and	  Achenbach	  2014)4.	  CDC	  responded	  with	  new	  guidelines	  on	  infection	  control	  for	  Ebola,	  announced	  on	  October	  20th,	  that	  included	  more	  stringent	  rules	  about	  personal	  protective	  equipment	  (Frieden	  2014).	  	  	  
III.	  Media,	  elite	  cues,	  and	  Ebola	  The	  policy	  decisions	  of,	  and	  conflicts	  between,	  political	  leaders	  already	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  elected	  politicians	  in	  a	  polarized	  political	  system.	  The	  media	  frame	  within	  which	  their	  actions	  were	  reported	  was	  also	  often	  shaped	  by	  partisan	  politics.	  	  Public	  opinion	  researchers	  find	  that	  even	  politically	  engaged	  citizens	  organize	  their	  policy	  views	  to	  fit	  with	  “cues”	  from	  elites	  who	  share	  their	  partisanship.	  In	  this	  model,	  politically	  engaged	  citizens	  have	  coherent	  opinions	  because	  they	  take	  cues	  from	  political	  elites	  (Zaller	  1992).	  This	  combination	  means	  that	  we	  can	  expect	  partisan	  elites	  to	  emphasize	  issues	  that	  catalyse	  their	  supporters’	  objections	  to	  the	  other	  party.	  Partisanship	  will	  drive	  policy	  opinions	  much	  more	  often	  than	  the	  reverse.	  	  Over	  the	  past	  half	  century,	  party	  elites	  have	  become	  increasingly	  polarized	  and	  this	  polarization	  increasingly	  affects	  voters.	  These	  findings	  have	  been	  supported	  by	  analysis	  of	  roll	  call	  voting,	  examination	  of	  party	  platforms,	  survey	  experiments	  and	  polls	  (McCarty,	  Poole,	  and	  Rosenthal	  2008,	  Green,	  Palmquist,	  and	  Schickler	  2004,	  Iyengar	  and	  Westwood	  2015,	  Iyengar,	  Sood,	  and	  Lelkes	  2012,	  Ferguson	  2015,	  Druckman,	  Peterson,	  and	  Slothuus	  2013,	  Fiorina	  and	  Abrams	  2008).	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When	  an	  issue,	  such	  as	  Ebola,	  becomes	  the	  subject	  of	  elite	  cueing,	  we	  should	  expect	  partisans	  to	  fall	  in	  and	  perceive	  the	  issue	  in	  a	  partisan	  manner.	  We	  should	  not	  expect	  an	  issue	  such	  as	  Ebola	  to	  change	  minds,	  but	  we	  can	  expect	  it	  to	  become	  incorporated	  into	  voters’	  rationalizations	  of	  deeply	  held	  partisan	  beliefs.	  This	  section	  examines	  the	  evidence	  related	  to	  differential	  coverage	  between	  traditionally	  conservative	  and	  liberal	  media	  in	  their	  duration	  and	  frequency	  of	  coverage	  of	  Ebola.	  During	  the	  time	  period	  of	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak,	  two	  of	  the	  highest	  rated	  cable	  news	  networks	  in	  the	  United	  States	  were	  Fox	  News	  and	  MSNBC	  (cable	  TV	  news	  has	  relatively	  few	  viewers,	  but	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  influential	  in	  politics).	  These	  two	  networks	  also	  provide	  an	  interesting	  case	  because	  of	  their	  differing	  ideological	  bents.	  Though	  the	  partisan	  symmetry	  is	  not	  perfect,	  Fox	  News	  is	  viewed	  as	  providing	  a	  more	  conservative	  slant	  on	  the	  news,	  while	  MSNBC	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  more	  liberal	  counterpoint	  (Grossman	  and	  Hopkins	  2016).	  Media	  and	  cable	  news	  viewership	  has	  been	  found	  to	  influence	  voting	  patterns	  among	  the	  American	  public	  (Martin	  and	  Yurukoglu	  2014,	  DellaVigna	  and	  Kaplan	  2006)	  and	  shapes	  the	  opinions	  of	  world	  events	  of	  viewers	  (Feldman	  et	  al.	  2012,	  Prior	  2013).	  Fox	  News,	  in	  particular,	  seems	  to	  have	  a	  big	  effect	  on	  conservative	  and	  Republican	  agendas	  and	  views	  (Skocpol	  and	  Williamson	  2012,	  Grossman	  and	  Hopkins	  2016).	  	  To	  examine	  whether	  the	  news	  media	  for	  traditionally	  conservative	  outlets	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  cover	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak,	  we	  searched	  television	  transcripts	  from	  March	  23	  through	  December	  6,	  2014	  for	  mention	  of	  the	  word	  ‘Ebola’.	  By	  breaking	  down	  the	  number	  of	  segments	  on	  Fox	  News	  and	  MSNBC	  by	  weekly	  coverage,	  a	  clear	  divergence	  in	  the	  frequency	  of	  Ebola	  coverage	  emerges	  (Figure	  1).	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Figure	  1:	  Ebola	  coverage	  on	  Fox	  and	  MSNBC.	  Source:	  Lexis-­‐Nexis	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Neither	  network	  had	  any	  mention	  of	  the	  word	  Ebola	  from	  March	  through	  May	  of	  2014,	  when	  the	  disease	  was	  spreading	  through	  West	  Africa.	  The	  first	  mention	  of	  the	  word	  on	  any	  segment	  for	  either	  network	  was	  during	  the	  first	  week	  of	  June	  on	  Fox	  News,	  but	  was	  only	  used	  as	  a	  throw-­‐away	  line	  for	  humour	  during	  the	  end	  of	  a	  segment	  related	  to	  events	  in	  Afghanistan.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  end	  of	  July,	  when	  American	  aid	  workers	  began	  to	  be	  evacuated	  to	  American	  hospitals	  for	  treatment,	  that	  both	  networks	  began	  covering	  the	  outbreak	  regularly.	  Even	  when	  both	  networks	  were	  covering	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak,	  Fox	  News	  continually	  devoted	  more	  airtime	  to	  cover	  the	  disease.	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  July	  to	  the	  end	  of	  November,	  Fox	  News	  had	  more	  stories	  about	  Ebola	  than	  MSNBC	  for	  all	  but	  six	  weeks.	  Of	  the	  six	  weeks	  where	  MSNBC	  devoted	  more	  coverage	  to	  the	  outbreak,	  half	  occurred	  following	  the	  midterm	  elections.	  Once	  the	  midterm	  elections	  were	  concluded,	  Fox	  News	  stopped	  devoting	  much	  air	  time	  to	  the	  outbreak,	  even	  as	  American	  citizens	  were	  diagnosed	  on	  United	  States	  soil.	  MSNBC	  was	  slower	  to	  lose	  interest	  after	  the	  election.	  Overall,	  Fox	  News	  averaged	  more	  than	  fourteen	  stories	  every	  week	  devoted	  to	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak,	  compared	  to	  eleven	  stories	  on	  MSNBC.	  	  Republican	  elites’	  cueing	  behaviour	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  explain	  the	  partisan	  disparity	  in	  views	  about	  Ebola.	  It	  became	  a	  “Republican”	  issue,	  critical	  of	  President	  Obama.	  An	  analysis	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  corpus	  of	  U.S	  print	  publications	  echoes	  these	  conclusions.	  	  Between	  September	  2014	  and	  February	  2015,	  Republicans	  were	  mentioned	  alongside	  Ebola	  twice	  as	  much	  or	  more	  than	  Democrats.	  This	  means	  that	  Ebola	  was	  a	  more	  popular	  topic	  amongst	  Republicans,	  or	  perhaps	  that	  Republicans	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were	  more	  successful	  in	  being	  included	  in	  media	  coverage	  involving	  Ebola	  (Daku	  and	  Dionne	  2015).	  	  Coverage	  of	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  by	  Fox	  News	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  content	  of	  that	  coverage.	  Republican	  commentators	  and	  politicians	  further	  strategically	  politicized	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  by	  connecting	  fears	  of	  Ebola	  with	  the	  fears	  of	  international	  terrorism	  and	  immigration.	  For	  many	  conservative	  politicians	  and	  commentators,	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  during	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  midterm	  elections	  became	  a	  further	  demonstration	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  American	  immigration	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  Eric	  Bolling,	  a	  Fox	  News	  commentator,	  commented	  that	  “we	  have	  a	  border	  that	  is	  so	  porous,	  Ebola	  or	  ISIS	  or	  Ebola	  on	  the	  backs	  of	  ISIS	  could	  come	  through	  our	  border”(Bradner	  2014b).	  	  Fox	  News	  explicitly	  connected	  Ebola	  with	  their	  coverage	  of	  the	  midterm	  elections.	  For	  example,	  as	  midterm	  election	  results	  were	  coming	  on	  November	  4,	  2014,	  Fox	  News	  correspondent	  Megyn	  Kelly	  explicitly	  linked	  Ebola	  to	  Democratic	  electoral	  fortunes	  when	  she	  commented	  on	  the	  New	  Hampshire	  Senate	  race	  between	  Democratic	  incumbent	  Jeanne	  Shaheen	  and	  challenger	  Scott	  Brown.	  She	  said,	  “Jeanne	  Shaheen	  was	  comfortably	  ahead	  until	  October	  9th.	  On	  October	  8th	  Thomas	  Duncan	  died	  of	  Ebola...	  And	  that	  is	  she	  wound	  up	  exploding	  in	  the	  month	  of	  October(Fox	  News	  Network	  2014).”	  	  Republican	  politicians	  also	  made	  the	  connection.	  Seven	  Republican	  senators	  wrote	  to	  President	  Obama	  asking	  him	  to	  impose	  a	  ban	  on	  travel	  from	  Ebola-­‐affected	  countries5.	  Thom	  Tillis,	  Republican	  Senate	  candidate	  in	  North	  Carolina	  argued	  in	  a	  debate	  with	  Democratic	  incumbent	  Kay	  Hagan,	  “Ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  we’ve	  got	  an	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Ebola	  outbreak.	  We	  have	  bad	  actors	  that	  can	  come	  across	  the	  border.	  We	  need	  to	  seal	  the	  border”(Sullivan	  2014).	  In	  interviews,	  Scott	  Brown,	  the	  Republican	  Senate	  candidate	  in	  New	  Hampshire,	  connected	  the	  spread	  of	  Ebola	  after	  Thomas	  Duncan’s	  death	  by	  saying	  that	  “if	  people	  are	  coming	  in	  from	  normal	  channels,	  can	  you	  imagine	  what	  they	  can	  do	  through	  our	  porous	  border.	  It’s	  so	  critically	  important	  to	  really	  use	  every	  tool,	  shut	  off	  every	  mechanism,	  for	  them	  and	  that	  disease	  and	  other	  potential	  diseases	  to	  come	  into	  our	  country”	  (Bradner	  2014a).	  Representative	  Louie	  Gohmert,	  a	  Texas	  Republican,	  lampooned	  liberals	  when	  he	  said	  of	  border	  controls	  that	  “countries	  that	  recognize	  that	  they	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  protect	  their	  people	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  it’s	  politically	  correct	  have	  done	  just	  that…We	  used	  to	  have	  quarantines	  of	  serious	  diseases	  that	  would	  kill	  people.	  But	  this	  day	  in	  time,	  gee,	  we	  don't	  want	  anybody	  to	  feel	  like	  they're	  being	  left	  out”	  (Bradner	  2014a).	  Beyond	  individual	  statements,	  there	  was	  an	  October	  spike	  in	  Republican	  campaign	  advertising	  calling	  the	  handling	  of	  Ebola	  a	  failure,	  for	  which	  Democratic	  politicians	  deserved	  blame,	  or	  showing	  images	  evoking	  public	  health	  threats	  such	  as	  people	  in	  haz-­‐mat	  suits	  (Talev	  2014).	  
	  
IV.	  Ebola,	  partisanship,	  and	  blame	  in	  the	  2014	  elections	  Ebola	  crystallized	  pre-­‐existing	  partisanship,	  which	  was	  peaking	  immediately	  before	  November	  2014	  elections.	  Unsurprisingly,	  public	  opinion	  about	  Ebola	  was	  substantially	  predicted,	  and	  cued,	  by	  partisan	  beliefs.	  	  	  
Blame	  attribution	  and	  partisanship	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The	  president’s	  political	  party	  almost	  always	  suffers	  electoral	  defeat	  during	  midterm	  elections.	  Over	  the	  past	  seventy	  years,	  the	  political	  party	  of	  the	  president	  has	  on	  average	  lost	  nearly	  thirty	  combined	  seats	  in	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  during	  a	  midterm	  election	  (Peters	  2014).	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  why	  the	  president’s	  political	  party	  suffers	  electoral	  defeats	  in	  midterm	  elections,	  with	  two	  standing	  out:	  blame	  attribution	  and	  partisan	  cueing.	  Both	  suggest	  that	  an	  issue	  such	  as	  Ebola	  would	  turn	  into	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  opposition	  to	  the	  incumbent	  president	  to	  blame	  the	  president	  for	  presumed	  incompetence,	  which	  is	  exactly	  what	  happened.	  The	  president	  is	  the	  most	  visible	  politician	  in	  the	  country	  and	  this	  visibility	  is	  a	  two-­‐edged	  sword	  politically	  for	  the	  president’s	  political	  party.	  It	  provides	  opportunity	  for	  policy	  advocacy	  and	  agenda	  shaping	  but	  it	  also	  inspires	  blame	  assignment	  by	  opposing	  partisans.	  During	  the	  midterm	  election	  season,	  opposition	  parties	  are	  able	  to	  campaign	  against	  presidential	  policy	  stances,	  controversies,	  and	  other	  events	  in	  their	  bid	  to	  gain	  more	  legislative	  seats.	  Party	  cues	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  an	  important	  explanation	  of	  the	  development	  and	  shaping	  of	  policy	  preferences	  and	  have	  led	  to	  blame	  attribution.	  Individuals	  who	  identify	  themselves	  with	  a	  political	  party	  alter	  their	  own	  policy	  views	  to	  correspond	  with	  their	  identified	  political	  party	  (Miller	  and	  Shanks	  1996).	  Party	  cues	  influence	  how	  voters	  view	  and	  blame	  politicians	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  government	  failure;	  voters	  with	  a	  stable	  party	  identification	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  blame	  officials	  of	  the	  opposite	  party	  (Malhotra	  and	  Kuo	  2008).	  The	  party	  that	  does	  not	  hold	  the	  White	  House	  will	  try	  to	  maximize	  its	  legislative	  power	  by	  highlighting	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failures	  of	  government	  performance	  and	  attributing	  them	  to	  the	  president’s	  party	  (Lee	  2009).	  	  	  
Salience	  of	  Ebola	  Outbreak	  As	  the	  United	  States	  had	  its	  first	  experiences	  with	  Ebola,	  polling	  firms	  began	  tracking	  respondents’	  level	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  story.	  More	  than	  one-­‐third	  of	  respondents	  reported	  that	  Ebola	  was	  a	  very	  important	  issue	  related	  to	  their	  vote	  for	  the	  midterm	  election	  (Preston	  2014).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  July,	  the	  Pew	  Research	  Center	  found	  that	  respondents	  were	  just	  as	  likely	  to	  have	  very	  closely	  or	  fairly	  closely	  followed	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  as	  those	  respondents	  who	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  story	  at	  all.	  As	  the	  weeks	  progressed	  a	  marked	  shift	  occurred	  amongst	  Pew	  respondents.	  Throughout	  August	  and	  September	  2014,	  the	  proportion	  of	  poll	  respondents	  who	  reported	  that	  they	  were	  following	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  “Very	  Closely”	  or	  “Fairly	  Closely”	  increased,	  while	  the	  percentage	  of	  respondents	  who	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  story	  decreased	  (Pew	  Research	  Center	  2014).	  This	  trend	  continued	  through	  the	  end	  of	  October,	  while	  news	  reported	  actions	  such	  as	  the	  decision	  of	  a	  Texas	  community	  college	  to	  reject	  three	  Nigerian	  students	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  might	  carry	  Ebola	  (Jaschik	  2014).	  The	  salience	  of	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  amongst	  the	  public	  was	  such	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  October,	  the	  Pew	  Research	  Center	  declared	  that	  the	  story	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most-­‐followed	  events	  for	  the	  American	  public	  since	  2010	  (Motel	  2014).	  	  Popular	  consciousness	  of	  Ebola	  reached	  its	  zenith	  during	  the	  period	  just	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  midterm	  elections	  in	  early	  November	  2014	  (Figure	  2).	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Figure	  2:	  Salience	  of	  Ebola.	  Source	  Pew	  Research	  Center	  (Pew	  Research	  Center	  2014)	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Evidence	  that	  concern	  with	  Ebola	  was	  electorally	  driven	  includes	  the	  sharp	  decline	  in	  the	  number	  of	  respondents	  who	  followed	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  election	  was	  past.	  Domestic	  Ebola	  events	  were	  still	  occurring,	  with	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  disease	  to	  New	  York	  City	  and	  the	  death	  of	  a	  Sierra	  Leonean	  physician	  in	  Nebraska	  occurring	  after	  the	  midterm	  elections,	  but	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  issue	  dropped	  sharply,	  along	  with	  media	  coverage.	  
	  
Politicization	  of	  the	  Ebola	  Outbreak	  and	  Response	  Public	  opinion	  surveys	  show	  both	  a	  high	  and	  highly	  politicized	  public	  view	  of	  Ebola	  (SteelFisher,	  Blendon,	  and	  Lasala-­‐Blanco	  2015).	  Nationally,	  there	  was	  voter	  support	  for	  both	  screening	  and	  quarantine	  interventions.	  A	  poll	  taken	  during	  the	  end	  of	  October	  found	  that	  sixty-­‐nine	  per	  cent	  of	  respondents	  believed	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  should	  screen	  all	  foreign	  citizens	  entering	  the	  country	  for	  symptoms	  of	  Ebola	  and	  quarantine	  those	  showing	  symptoms.	  Additionally,	  thirty	  per	  cent	  of	  those	  who	  responded	  believed	  that	  no	  foreign	  citizen	  traveling	  from	  West	  Africa	  should	  even	  be	  allowed	  entry	  into	  the	  country	  (CNN/ORC	  2014).	  	  Polling	  indicates	  a	  clear	  politicization	  of	  views	  about	  interventions	  to	  control	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak.	  Republican	  respondents	  were	  nearly	  twice	  as	  likely	  to	  agree	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  should	  prevent	  entry	  into	  the	  United	  States	  for	  anyone,	  foreign	  or	  United	  States	  citizen,	  who	  had	  travelled	  from	  West	  Africa,	  than	  Democratic	  respondents	  (Fox	  News	  2014b).	  Similar	  differences	  between	  Republican	  and	  Democratic	  respondents	  are	  evident	  in	  views	  of	  the	  policy	  option	  of	  banning	  all	  flights	  from	  West	  African	  countries	  (Fox	  News	  2014b).	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the	  outbreak,	  with	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  Democratic	  respondents	  expressing	  trust	  in	  the	  media	  (Pew	  Research	  Center	  2014).	  The	  closer	  to	  the	  midterm	  elections,	  the	  more	  partisanship	  related	  to	  estimates	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  Ebola	  outbreak	  striking	  the	  United	  States	  (Figure	  4).	  From	  August	  to	  October	  2014,	  there	  was	  little	  partisan	  difference	  in	  level	  of	  concern	  over	  an	  outbreak	  (Fox	  News	  2014b).	  However,	  starting	  in	  October,	  Republicans	  became	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  or	  somewhat	  concerned	  about	  the	  spread	  of	  Ebola,	  in	  comparison	  with	  Democratic	  respondents	  (Fox	  News	  2014b).	  In	  other	  words,	  just	  before	  an	  election,	  voters	  identified	  with	  the	  Republican	  Party	  became	  steadily	  more	  concerned	  about	  Ebola	  and	  voters	  identified	  with	  Democratic	  Party	  became	  less	  so.	  It	  seems	  that	  partisanship	  and	  cues	  from	  party	  elites	  were	  shaping	  views	  of	  the	  handling	  of	  Ebola	  for	  many	  in	  the	  public.	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V.	  Conclusion	  The	  United	  States’	  response	  to	  Ebola	  was	  neither	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  nor	  consensual,	  but	  rather	  a	  mixture	  of	  executive	  action,	  suasion,	  and	  political	  argument.	  We	  highlighted	  three	  themes,	  which	  help	  explain	  the	  response	  to	  Ebola	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  First,	  its	  fragmented	  health	  care	  system	  meant	  that	  the	  responses	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  Ebola	  on	  the	  ground	  would	  be	  highly	  variable,	  depending	  substantially	  on	  the	  particular	  health	  care	  organization	  and	  its	  infection	  control,	  legal,	  and	  media	  strategies.	  Additionally,	  American	  federalism	  meant	  that	  states	  would	  almost	  certainly	  have	  a	  major	  role.	  States	  are	  both	  responsible	  for	  much	  public	  health	  and	  a	  platform	  for	  their	  governors,	  who	  are	  major	  political	  figures.	  The	  federal	  government	  has	  inevitable	  internal	  coordination	  problems,	  and	  while	  CDC	  was	  present	  and	  active,	  broader	  coordination,	  including	  coordination	  of	  multiple	  erstwhile	  coordinators,	  awaited	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  White	  House	  after	  media	  and	  political	  criticism.	  	  Second,	  the	  Ebola	  issue	  predictably	  became	  politicized,	  as	  Republican	  elites	  identified	  an	  issue	  that	  interested	  their	  base	  just	  before	  an	  election,	  and	  made	  it	  a	  topic	  of	  prominent,	  negative,	  media	  and	  political	  discussion	  while	  Democratic	  elites	  and	  voters	  shied	  away	  from	  criticizing	  the	  federal	  executive’s	  response.	  This	  contributed	  to	  a	  polarization	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  topic	  in	  the	  month	  before	  the	  election,	  with	  Republican	  identified	  voters	  more	  concerned,	  worried,	  and	  critical	  than	  Democrats.	  The	  disjunction	  between	  a	  partisan	  and	  Presidency-­‐focused	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understanding	  of	  accountability	  and	  blame	  and	  a	  far	  more	  diffuse	  capacity	  to	  act	  is	  a	  constant	  of	  American	  politics,	  and	  increases	  in	  importance	  as	  partisan	  polarization	  increases	  (Hacker	  and	  Pierson	  2005).	  Third,	  conservative	  media	  highlighted	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  earlier	  and	  more	  frequently	  than	  liberal	  media.	  Media	  cued	  voters	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  Ebola	  which	  led	  to	  the	  instrumentalisation	  and	  politicization	  of	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak.	  	  Our	  analysis	  highlights	  the	  need	  for	  public	  health	  officials	  to	  understand	  the	  logic	  of	  blame	  and	  partisanship	  in	  American	  politics.	  Politicization	  and	  blame	  attribution	  are	  constants	  of	  politics	  and	  should	  be	  expected.	  As	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  progressed	  through	  the	  political	  and	  media	  cycle,	  it	  began	  to	  take	  on	  new	  rhetorical	  forms.	  Politicians	  and	  media	  organizations	  began	  to	  conflate	  Ebola	  with	  broader	  concerns,	  including	  national	  security,	  immigration	  policy,	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  If	  there	  had	  been	  a	  Republican	  president	  in	  office,	  we	  can	  expect	  that	  Democratic	  political	  elites	  would	  have	  been	  highly	  critical	  and	  Democratic	  voters	  more	  disturbed	  by	  federal	  performance.	  Indeed,	  the	  political	  fallout	  from	  the	  Flint	  water	  crisis	  in	  2015-­‐16	  indicates	  that	  both	  parties	  are	  apt	  to	  use	  public	  health	  disasters	  to	  serve	  their	  political	  ends.	  This	  is	  not	  all	  bad.	  The	  logic	  of	  democratic	  politics	  relies	  on	  harnessing	  opposition	  party	  incentives	  to	  expose	  and	  trumpet	  faults	  of	  the	  government	  in	  power	  (Hood	  2010).	  	  Similarly,	  our	  analysis	  also	  points	  to	  overconfidence	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  health	  care	  systems	  around	  the	  US	  were	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  managing	  Ebola	  whenever	  and	  wherever	  it	  occurred.	  Health	  providers	  in	  the	  United	  States	  lacked	  preparation	  and	  skill	  to	  effectively	  handle	  Ebola	  patients.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak,	  a	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small	  handful	  of	  infectious	  disease	  ‘magnet’	  hospitals	  handled	  all	  but	  two	  patients:	  the	  University	  of	  Nebraska	  Medical	  Center,	  Emory	  University	  Hospital,	  and	  the	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health	  Clinical	  Center.	  Each	  of	  these	  hospitals	  had	  the	  clinical	  expertise	  and	  the	  physical	  space	  for	  biocontainment	  to	  handle	  the	  increased	  demands	  of	  Ebola	  patients.	  THPH	  and	  similar	  tertiary	  hospitals	  simply	  do	  not	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  adequately	  care	  for	  Ebola	  patients	  and	  to	  protect	  clinicians	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  as	  the	  hospitals	  which	  cared	  for	  Ebola	  patients	  (Bellevue	  hospital	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  a	  major	  centre	  for	  infectious	  disease	  for	  centuries,	  treated	  one	  patient	  successfully).	  There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  why	  people	  might	  advocate	  for	  the	  capacity	  to	  handle	  Ebola	  and	  similar	  diseases	  in	  every	  tertiary	  hospital,	  not	  least	  the	  impressive	  boost	  to	  expenditure	  on	  staff	  and	  equipment	  it	  would	  entail	  and	  the	  potential	  brand	  visibility	  of	  successfully	  handling	  cases.	  There	  was	  a	  much	  better	  case	  for	  communications	  to	  stress	  that	  an	  Ebola	  patient	  should	  be	  stabilized	  and	  transferred	  to	  a	  more	  appropriate	  clinical	  site	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  In	  a	  fragmented	  system	  with	  no	  good	  way	  for	  public	  health	  officials	  to	  direct	  health	  care	  decisions,	  though,	  there	  is	  a	  high	  chance	  that	  ambitious	  tertiary	  care	  hospitals	  build	  their	  own	  capacity	  to	  manage	  highly	  infectious	  diseases.	  	  More	  capacity	  might	  be	  helpful	  (Klain	  2016)	  but	  it	  will	  likely	  be	  unplanned	  and	  we	  will	  learn	  of	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  next	  outbreak.	  	  	  	  The	  Ebola	  experience	  is	  also	  suggestive	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  U.S.	  federal	  bureaucracy.	  Even	  if	  the	  strongest,	  and	  probably	  only	  powerful	  form	  of	  coordination	  in	  the	  federal	  government	  is	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  President,	  the	  Ebola	  experience	  suggests	  that	  the	  U.S.	  federal	  bureaucracy	  could	  be	  more	  amenable	  
	   34	  
to	  coordination	  in	  public	  health	  emergencies.	  Both	  expertise	  and	  formal	  coordination	  for	  public	  health	  emergencies	  are	  spread	  across	  the	  CDC,	  HHS,	  the	  DHS,	  and	  the	  NSC.	  The	  latter	  two	  have	  little	  public	  health	  expertise,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  framing	  public	  health	  emergencies	  as	  security	  issues	  or	  tasking	  emergency	  management	  bureaucracies	  with	  handling	  them	  produces	  better	  public	  health	  policy.	  Klain’s	  own	  reflections	  on	  Ebola	  focused	  on	  how	  the	  lack	  of	  clear	  responsibilities	  dissipated	  public	  health	  expertise	  and	  slowed	  response.	  He	  called	  for	  a	  permanent	  public	  health	  emergency	  office	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  need	  for	  a	  future	  czar	  for	  each	  disease	  (Klain	  2016).	  	  Finally,	  regardless	  of	  organizational	  issues,	  our	  analysis	  points	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  expertise,	  which	  underpins	  CDC’s	  powers	  of	  suasion	  in	  a	  fragmented	  system	  with	  multiple	  incentives	  who	  have	  incentives	  to	  act.	  Authoritative	  knowledge,	  which	  CDC	  is	  usually	  presumed	  to	  have,	  is	  a	  powerful	  force	  to	  inform,	  standardize	  behaviour,	  and	  formulate	  appropriate	  responses.	  That	  means,	  of	  course,	  that	  CDC	  must	  be	  sure	  its	  knowledge	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  authoritative-­‐	  partly	  a	  challenge	  for	  its	  own	  scientific	  credibility	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  public	  health	  practitioners,	  but	  also	  a	  challenge	  given	  partisan	  polarization	  of	  public	  views	  about	  any	  executive	  agency.	  	  Our	  working	  title	  for	  this	  article	  was	  “Ebola	  in	  the	  United	  States:	  Well,	  what	  did	  you	  expect?”	  Public	  health	  policy	  that	  depends	  on	  suasion	  such	  as	  CDC	  guidelines,	  addressed	  to	  governments	  and	  providers	  alike,	  might	  frustrate	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  one	  best	  way	  and	  want	  a	  hierarchical	  organization	  to	  do	  it.	  Likewise,	  energetic	  action	  by	  executives	  with	  whom	  one	  disagrees	  can	  be	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frustrating	  (though	  federalism	  at	  least	  quarantines	  bad	  policy	  in	  one	  jurisdiction).	  Partisan	  media	  and	  public	  opinion	  can	  create	  or	  misdirect	  blame	  even	  when	  the	  system	  works	  well,	  and	  can	  make	  policy	  more	  difficult.	  Nonetheless,	  fragmentation,	  reliance	  on	  suasion	  and	  executive	  action	  to	  make	  policy,	  and	  an	  oppositional	  political	  system	  that	  finds	  fault	  for	  political	  reasons	  are	  at	  the	  core	  of	  American	  public	  health	  policymaking.	  We	  should	  not	  expect	  a	  different	  story	  in	  the	  next	  public	  health	  crisis.	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  for	  President.	  Nine	  of	  the	  seventeen	  declared	  Republican	  primary	  contenders	  for	  the	  Presidential	  nomination	  in	  2016	  were	  or	  had	  been	  governors,	  as	  had	  one	  of	  the	  three	  Democrats.	  
2	  Nina	  Pham	  v.	  Texas	  Health	  Resources,	  Inc.	  Case	  DC-­‐15-­‐02252,	  District	  Court	  of	  Dallas	  County,	  Texas,	  filed	  2	  March	  2015.	  
3	  ‘President	  Barack	  Obama's	  spokesman,	  Josh	  Earnest,	  made	  clear	  Monday	  that	  the	  White	  House	  was	  not	  thrilled	  that	  individual	  states	  had	  implemented	  quarantines	  viewed	  as	  unfair	  to	  returning	  healthcare	  workers,	  though	  he	  acknowledged	  the	  states'	  rights	  to	  set	  them.	  "We	  want	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  whatever	  policies	  are	  put	  in	  place	  in	  this	  country	  to	  protect	  the	  American	  public	  do	  not	  serve	  as	  a	  disincentive	  to	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  doctors	  and	  nurses	  from	  this	  country	  volunteering	  to	  travel	  to	  West	  Africa	  to	  treat	  Ebola	  patients,"	  Earnest	  said.’	  (Wulfhorst	  and	  Morgan	  2014)	  	  
4	  See	  also	  the	  transcript	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Energy	  and	  Commerce	  Committee	  hearing	  “Examining	  the	  U.S.	  Public	  Health	  Response	  to	  the	  Ebola	  Outbreak”,	  on	  16	  October	  2014,	  at	  which	  Frieden	  and	  a	  representative	  of	  THPH	  testified.	  
	  
5	  Letter	  of	  October	  17,	  2014	  from	  Senate	  Judiciary	  Committee	  Republicans,	  available	  at:	  http://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/judiciary/upload/Immigration%2C%2010-­‐17-­‐14%2C%20Cease%20visas%20from%20Ebola%20countries%2C%20letter%20from%20GOP%20Judiciary%20members.pdf	  Accessed	  13	  April	  2016	  
